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TheInfluence of Call Provisions and
Coupon Rate on the Yields of
Corporate Bonds Mark W. Frankena
INTRODUCTION ANDSUMMARYOF FINDINGS
This study examines the effect of call provisions and the coupon rate
on the yields of corporate bonds. The first section reviews the function
of the call option in corporate bonds and the means of providing call
protection to the investor. The second section considers the extent
to which and the reasons that corporate bonds actually were called
prior to maturity in the period since the Accord of 1951. The third
section examines the influence of coupon rate on the yield andprice
NOTE: Most of the research for this study was done in the summers of 1964
and 1965; much of the empirical material was later updated to 1966. Since this
work was completed, a number of improvements have occurred to me and have
been suggested by others. Unfortunately, I have had to leave several of these as
footnotes.
I am greatly indebted to the late Joseph W. Conard, my teacher at Swarth-
more College and director of the Bureau's Interest Rate Project until his un-
timely death, for suggesting the problems considered in this study and for many
discussions during itsearlier stages. Sidney Homer of Salomon Brothers and
Hutzler provided invaluable assistance in answering questions dealing with the
institutions of the corporate bond market and making available much of the
data underlying this study. Albert Wojnilower of the First Boston Corporation
also kindly made essential data available.Phillip Cagan, Paul Cootner, and
Frank C. Jen read an earlier version of the manuscript and suggested improve-
ments. Finally, this paper would not have been completed without the generous
help and encouragement of Jack M. Guttentag.Influences on Corporate Bond Yields 135
behavior of seasoned corporate bonds. The last section considers the
influence of call deferments on new issue yields.
The call option is the right of a borrowing company to redeem
its debt prior to maturity, generally at a few points above par. Call-
ability has several advantages to the borrower. Most important is the
ability to reduce interest costs if new issue yields decline substantially
below the coupon rate on the outstanding issue. The call option also
allows the borrower to eliminate restrictive provisions in the indenture
of a bond, replace an issue with stock or with a different type of debt
instrument, or retire an issue completely.
However, callability has important disadvantages for the lender.
If the investoris concerned with holding-period yields, and hence
current market prices, callable bonds are lessattractive than call-
protected bonds because their price appreciation islimited. Because
of the. threat of call when yields are low, market prices of callable
bonds do not normally rise more than a point or two above the call
price. As a result, the potential capital gain on callable bonds in the
event of a general decline in market yields is limited. Alternatively,
when callable bonds are actually called for redemption, investors
may be forced to reinvest in lower yielding bonds and incur addi-
tional transaction costs.
The benefits of the call option to borrowers and disadvantages to
lenders suggests the hypothesis underlying this study, that call provi-
sions should influence the yields to maturity of corporate bonds. There
are four characteristics of a bond that influence the probability that
the call option will be exercised, the size of the benefits and costs of
call when it is exercised, and the extent to which capital gains are
limited in periods of declining interest rates. These are (1) the coupon
rate, (2) the term to maturity, (3) the call price, and (4) the call
deferment, if there is one. All of the bonds used in this study were
long term, and no attempt was made to determine the influence Of
maturity on yield which results from the existence of the call option.
Given the level of new issue yields, and assuming maturities con-
stant, the profitability of calling an issue for refunding then depends
on the call price and the coupon rate. The higher the call price and
the lower the coupon rate,the less profitableis refunding to the
borrower. On the other hand, the higher the call price and the lower
the coupon rate, the greater is the opportunity for capital gains for the
investor and the less the chance of losing a high return through call.
As a result, bonds with a lower call price or higher coupon rate
should bear a higher yield. In addition, a bond that is immediately136 Essays on interest Rates
callable is less attractive to investors than a bond with a call defer-
ment, which prevents the borrower from calling the issue for a period
of years after issue. Hence, bonds with deferments should carry lower
yields than freely callable bonds.
The empirical part of this study is limited to consideration of the
influence of coupon rate on the yields of seasoned bonds and the
influence of call deferments on the yields of seasoned and new issues.
Yield series were constructed for this study covering seasoned long-
term callable Aa-Aaa public utility bonds, separately for bonds with
a coupon rate of 2% to percent and for bonds at each coupon
rate between 3% and 534 per cent at intervals of one-eighth per cent.
The series are monthJy and cover the period from January 1957
through October 1967.
In analyzing the influence of coupon rate, yield spreads between
each series with a coupon rate of 33/4to5% per cent and the series
with a coupon rate of 2% to per cent were calculated, and
multiple regressions were run to explain the variance in the spread.
The regression covering all bonds "explained" 78 per cent of the vari-
ance in the spread. The independent variables used in the regression
were: (1) the coupon rate on the higher coupon bond used in measur-
ing the yield spread—this variable had a positive regression coefficient,
indicating that a higher coupon rate is associated with a larger yield
spread. (2) The level of yields on new issues of callable Aa utility
bonds—this variable had a negative regression coefficient, indicating
that when yields are lower, yield spreads due to differences in coupon
rate are greater. This is partly because the price appreciation of the
higher coupon bonds is restrained by call price, so that the yields
on these bonds cannot continue tofallalong with the yields on
lower coupon bonds. In addition, at lower yields investors become
more apprehensive about the greater danger of call and expect more
limited capital gains on higher coupon bonds. (3) A weighted average
of changes in new issue yields over the previous six months—this
variable had a negative correlation coefficient, indicating that when
yields have been falling yield spreads tend to increase. The explanation
for this is that, because of the general cyclical forces affecting interest
rates, falling yields generate the expectation that yields are likely to
continue falling in the near future. (4) A time trend, indicating that
yield spreads declined over the period studied—the primary explana-
tion of the significance of trend is that the expected "normal" and
cyclical minimum levels of interest rates apparently rose over the
period. With rates no longer expected tofallto very low levelsinfluences on Corporate Bond Yields 137
during recessions, there was a reduction in the danger of call and of
the limitation of capital gains on higher coupon bonds. A second
explanation of the time trend is that the secular increase in funds
channeled through institutional investors, together with a cumulative
drought of publicly offered corporate bonds, reduced the spread due
to coupon differences.
We also ran five separate regressions for bonds with each of the
coupon rates from 4% to 5 per cent. The independent variables dis-
cussed above were all used except for the coupon rate, which was
held constant in each regression. In addition, we included the volume
of publicly offered new issuesof corporate bonds for the three
months preceding the observation ofyield spread.All regression
coefficients had the same signs as before, and the volume variable
was significant with a positive regression coefficient. This supports the
hypothesis that, when the volume of new corporate issues is larger,
the spread due to coupon differences tends to increase. Together these
variables "explained" 81 to 89 per cent of the variance in the yield
spread.
To examine how refunding defermentsinfluencetheyieldsof
seasoned bonds, yield series were constructed at each coupon rate for
bonds with refunding deferments of two years or more; otherwise,
these bonds were the same as those used to derive the series on freely
callable bonds. The hypotheses tested were that the call protection
afforded by a refunding deferment would make a bond more attrac-
tive to investors and hence reduce its yield, and that the amount by
which a deferment would reduce the yield would increase as the
coupon rate increased and as the level of yields decreased. These
hypotheses were confirmed. On seasoned bonds with intermediate and
high coupon rates, deferments reduced yields to maturity by five to
nine basis points during much of the period from 1957 to 1961, and
they reduced yields by more than twice that when price appreciation
on the callable bonds was limited by the call price and the prices of
the deferred bonds rose a few points above the call prices.
The final part of the study examines how refunding deferments
have influenced the yields on new issues. Comparisons were made of
the offering yields, and the yields after the termination of the under-
writing syndicate, of freely callable and deferred utility bonds offered
within ten days of each other and having the same quality rating
(Aaa, Aa, or A). We found that, although the data for 1957 were
ambiguous, the data for 1958 through 1966 consistently supported
the hypothesis that deferments reduce yields unless new issue coupon138 Essays on interest Rates
rates are very low. In times of high coupons on new issues, refunding
deferments of five years commonly reduced average yields by 9 to 14
basis points. This is in contrast to the finding of Hess and Winn,
whose study of the influence of refunding deferments on the yield of
new corporate issues offered from 1926 to 1959 concluded that the
"length of call deferment did not influence yields except during the
last six months of this 34-year period." It is the contention of the
present study that their conclusion was not justified by the data, and
that in any case the conclusion does not apply to the period from
1958 to 1966.
One implication of the finding that call features do influence yields
is that the capital market is considerably less imperfect than Hess and
Winn and various agencies regulating the issuance of corporate securi-
ties have implied. Another implication of this study is that, because
of the great effect of the coupon rate on corporate bond yields, and
the smaller but nonetheless significant influence of refunding defer-
ments (particularly on high coupon bonds in periods of low yields),
many commonly used series of corporate bond yields are inaccurate
indicators of the state of the corporate bond market. Furthermore,
many of the calculated yield spreads between new and seasoned
corporate issues,2 between corporates and governments, and between
corporate bonds of different quality are not accurate. Similarly, both
the shape of yield curves and the cyclical movements of interest
rates on seasoned corporate bonds depend very heavily on the levels
of coupons and deferments included in the series.
THE CALL OPTION AND CALL PROTECTION
The call option is The right of a borrowing company to redeem its
debt prior to maturity. Virtually all long-term corporate bonds offered
publicly in the postwar period have allowed for such calls during
most if not all of the period for which the bonds, were issued. The
1ArleighP. Hess, Jr., and Willis J. Winn, The Value of Ihe Call Privilege,
University of Pennsylvania, 1962, p. 80.
2Theaverage yield spread between the Moody series for new and seasoned
Aa public utility bonds in the period 1952 through 1963 was 17.5 basis points,
but the average new-seasoned spread was reduced to 9.7 basis points when
measured between the yield on new issues and the yield on seasoned bonds
with the same coupon rate as the new issues. See Joseph W. Conard and Mark
W. Frankena, "The Yield Spread Between New and Seasoned Corporate Bonds,
1952—63," in Essays on interest Rates, Vol. 1, Jack M. Guttentag and Philip
Cagan, editors, New York, NBER, 1969, pp. 143—222.influences on Corporate Bond Yields 139
first date on which the call option may be exercised may be imme-
diately after issue or may be deferred a number of years, usually five.
The indenture of each bond specifiescall price which the borrower
must pay at the time of call. Normally this is about $103 to $108 per
$100 of principal for call immediately following the date of issue
and declines toward par by a fraction of a point each year as the
bond approaches maturity.
Advantages of Callability to the Borrower
Callability has several advantages to the borrower. The most important
isthe ability to reduce interest costsif new issueyields decline
substantially below the coupon rate on the outstanding issue. If the
yield to maturity calculated from the call price is greater than the
present new issue yield, the issuer gains by calling and refunding his
debt.
When new issue yields are low, such interest savings may be realized
simply by refunding a bond with an issue that is identical except that
the coupon rate is lower. However, in cases where the company does
not intend to retire an outstanding issue at maturity,it can replace
the issue with one of longer maturity. In this case,, the borrower can
take advantage of a new issue interest rate that is low relative both to
the coupon rate on its existing issue and to the yield that it expects to
prevail at the time the outstanding issue would mature.
While most called bonds are replaced by ones which are identical,
except in coupon and maturity, the call option also allows the bor-
rower to replace its issue with a different type of bond or with stock,
or to retire it completely. The outstanding bond may contain restric-
tive provisions in its indenture that limit additional borrowing, sale
of assets, merger, or dividends. Such provisions may considerably
hamper the operations of a company and, hence, justify call even
when interest savings are not realized. Particularly after a merger,
for example, it may be considered necessary to simplify the capital
structure of the company by replacing a number of existing issues with
a single new issue. Similarly, bonds may be. called in connection with
a reorganization by court order. Finally, changed circumstances of
the company may call for a change in capital structure. The call
option facilitates such change, and thus provides flexibility in the face
of uncertainty.3
The comments above assume that if there were no call option the borrower
would not be able to repurchase its debt in the open market at less than the call140 Essays on Interest Rates
Disadvantages of Callability to the Lender
Callability has important disadvantages to the lender. If the investor
is concerned with holding-period yields on marketable bonds, call-
able bonds are lessattractive than call-protected ones because the
price appreciation of the former is limited. Because of the threat of
call when yields are low, the prices of callable bonds do not normally
rise more than a point or two above the call price.4 As a result, in
the event of a fall in yields, the potential capital gains on callable
bonds, particularly those which are immediately callable and have high
coupons or low call prices, are limited.
For example, a 25-year bond with a coupon rate of 5.00 per cent
might have a call price of 106. If this bond were selling at its call
price, its yield to maturity would be about 4.60 per cent. In order
for this bond to have a yield to maturity of 4.00 per cent, its market
price would have to rise to 115%; and to have a yield of 3.50 per
cent, its price would have to rise to almost 125. Because the market
price never rises appreciably above 106, almost 10 points in capital
gains would be lost if market yields fell from 4.60 to 4.00 per cent
and almost 20 points would be lost if yields fell to 3.50 per cent.
Beyond this, when callable bonds are actually called for redemption,
the investing institution may be forced to reinvest at lower yields and
incur the transaction cost of reinvestment.5
price. This is a reasonable assumption, for under conditions where itis profit-
able to call a bond the call price would be below •the price that would prevail
if there were no call option. In any case, it would be impossible for a borrower
to buy back allits debt in the market at a reasonable cost. The bond price
would rise to an exorbitant level as bonds were purchased. Similarly, in order
to remove restrictions placed on the borrower by the indenture of a bond, it
might be necessary to pay a high price to bondholders.
This pertains to asked prices. Bid prices rise even less above call price.
The cost to the investor attributable to actual call, over and above that due
to thethreatof call, depends Qfl whether or not the investor would hold the
bond to maturity regardless of its market price. If the bond is nonmarketable
or if the investor holding a marketable bond plans to hold itto maturity re-
gardless of market price, the investor loses a series of payments of coupon and
principal when the bond is called, and receives the call price in its place. As-
suming the investor reinvests at the prevailing, and presumably low, rate of
interest on low coupon bonds for the remaining term of the old bond, the cost
of call to the investor will be the present discounted value of (a) the differ-
ence in the coupons received, plus (b) the cost of reinvestment and the lost
interest for the period, if any, during which cash is held, minus (c) the differ-Influences on Corporate Bond Yields 141
Regardless of whether interest rates fall or the bond isactually
called, the option to call introduces uncertainty about the term of the
investor's holdings and the continuity of future income. It thus limits
the extent to which an institution can assure itself of a given flow of
interest income in the future.
Call Features
The preceding summary of the benefits of the call option to borrowers
and of protection against the option to lenders suggests the hypothesis
underlying this study, that call provisions should influence yields to
maturity on corporate bonds. To test this hypothesis itis necessary
to consider the features of a bond that are relevant to the probability
that the call option will be exercised, to the size of the benefits and
costs of call when itis exercised, and to the extent to which capital
gains are limited in periods of declining interest rates.
The primary variables determining theprofitability of refunding
to reduce interest costs are the coupon rate on the outstanding issue
relative to that on new issues, the call price on the outstanding bond
relative to the price received for the new issue, and the maturity of
the bond called. The three characteristics of the outstanding bond that
influence the profitability of refunding are,thus, coupon rate,call
price, and maturity. A higher call price reduces the profitability of call
by increasing the present cost of replacing the outstanding issue. A
lower coupon or shorter maturity reduces the profitability of call by
reducing the future benefits of replacing the outstanding debt, the
first by reducing the annual benefit,the second by reducing the
number of years over which the benefit is received.
In addition to the above characteristics of bonds that affect the
probability of call, one would expect that the length of time during
which call cannot be exercised would influence yields. There are too
few completely noncallable bonds to test for a difference in yields
between freely callable and noncallable issues. Nevertheless, in the
period since 1957 a large proportion of new issues have been non-
refundable at lower interest cost, and a few noncallable for any reason,
ence between the call price received and the purchase price of the new bond.
When looked at from the point of view of holding-period yields based on the
market price of the bond in question, the cost of actual call would be simply
the market price minus the call price.142 Essays on Interest Rates
until five years after issue.8 On any bond with a coupon rate high
enough and call price low enough that there is danger of call, a call
deferment should reduce the yield.
One section of this paper examines the influence of the coupon rate
on yields. Similar attention is not given to the influence of the call
price for reasons noted in the text (see pp. 152—153). From a bond
table it can be seen that an increase of two points in the call price of a
25-year high coupon bond has approximately the same effect on the
yield to maturity calculated from call price, and hence on the profit-
ability of call or the limitation of capital gains, as a reduction of %
percent in coupon rate with constant call price. As a result, yields
should be influenced approximately the same amount by a two point
difference in call price as by a %percent difference in coupon rate
in the other direction.
One may hypothesize that, if coupon and call price are held con-
stant, bonds with longer maturity will carry higher yields in compensa-
tion for greater call risk. This effect, however, is likely to be small
over the 20—40 year range covered by the bonds included in our data.
The effect of callabiity on term structure is not studied.
THE EXERCISE OF THE CALL OPTION
In this section we examine the extent to which the call option has
been exercised since 1951 and the reasons for calls. Although many
typesof bonds have been examined, data presented here cover
publicly offered utility bonds rated A or better which were issued and
called during 1951—63.
The exercise of the call option is dominated by the refunding motive,
and the volume of redemptions depends largely on the level of new
issue yields relative to previous peak new issue yields or coupon rates.
The largest volume of redemptions took place in 1954—55, 1958,
1961, and 1962—63, when new issue yields fell below earlier peaks.
Almost no calls were made during periods of high interest rates.
The first major period of refunding after the Treasury-Federal
Reserve Accord of 1951 was the fifteen months from March 1954
through May when new issue yields were low enough for profit-
able refunding of a large number of bonds that were issued during
°BetweenJanuary 1957 and June 1966, 248 of the 711 new A, Aa, and
Aaa utility bond issues had deferments.
These are the offering dates of the new issues whose proceeds were used
for refunding the issues called. The calls were actually made in May 1954
through July 1955.Influences on Corporate Bond Yields 143
April to September 1953, when yields were high. Table 3-1 shows
the number of callable utility issues offered publicly in 1953(the
bottom number in each cell) and the number of these issues called for
refunding in 1954—S 5 (upper number). None were called after 1955.
There were 72 freely callable utility bonds rated A or higher of-
fered publicly in 1953. Of these, 32 were called in the following two
years. Of the 42 bonds issued between April and September 1953,
30 were refunded. Part of the proceeds of between a third and a
TABLE 3-1. Publicly Offered Utility Bonds Issued in 1953 and Called in
1 954—55, by Quality Rating and Coupon Rate
Coupon Rate Aaa Aa A Total














NOTE: The bottom number in each cell shows the number of callable utility issues
offered publicly in 1953; the upper number shows the number of these issues called for
refunding in 1954-55. None were called after 1955.
SOURCE: Data from Moody's Bond Survey (weekly) and Moody's Bond Record
(monthly), Moody's Investors Service, N. Y.
fourth of the A-Aaa utility issues offered publicly in the period from
March 1954 to May 1955 were used for refunding.
Because of the limited variability of call prices and maturities and
the absence of call deferments on all but one of the 1953 issues, the
two most important variables determining whether a bond could be
refunded profitably were the coupon rate and quality rating. Quality
rating is important because it influences the rate at which new issues
can be sold. The higher the coupon rate and the quality, the larger
was the proportion of the callable bonds actually called. For example,
of the 23 bonds with coupons of 4 per cent or greater, 17 were called;
all those riot called were rated A. Of the 17 bonds with coupons of
3% per cent or lower, only 1 was called and it was rated Aaa.8
Only four of the bonds issued in 1954 through 1956 were subse-
8Inclusionof bonds issued in 1951 and1952does not alterthis general
tendency.144 Essays on Interest Rates
quently called. All of these were called at a loss in connection with
mergers that made itnecessary to replace the debt of one of the
companies involved.
In 1957, yields on new issues reached their highest level in many
years. It would have been profitable to refund a great many of these
bonds in early 1958 when rates were considerably lower, but in fact
refunding was light. Only 7 of the 78 callable utility bonds issued
publicl)j in 1957 and rated A or better were refunded. The reason for
the small number of refundings in 1958 despite the low level
of new jssue yields was the sudden unexpected rise in yields after
June. Itis clear from the contemporary financial press that a sub-
stantial fjjrther çlecline in new issue yields was expected and that bor-
rowers were holding off on refunding until maximum interest
savings could be made. The market reversal came so quickly that a
number of that had already announced refundings for the
third quarter of were forced to abandon their plans.
As in the period from 1954 to 1956, none of the bonds issued in
1958 had a high enough to justify refunding later. The only
bond called was at a loss in terms of interest cost in connec-
tion with a in 1962.
Five bonds coupons of 5% per cent or higher were refunded
in the first half of 1961, but it was not until 1962—63 that refunding
volume again reached large proportions. Of 105 callable bonds with
coupons of 5 per cent or higher issued in 1957—61 and still outstand-
ing, 46 were during 1962—63. Two bonds with coupons below
5 per cent were c?lled at a loss in connection with a merger.
Most high public utility bond refundings were thus designed
to reduce costs. In many other cases the new bond issued to
replace the one carried a longer maturity, thus assuring low
interest costs a longer period. Considering the upward trend in
interest rates through the 1950's, the ability of companies to make
such advance refundings in 1954—55 and 1958 clearly reduced their
interest costs appreciably. Similar conclusions apply to lower grade
issues, and to industrial, railroad, and finance company obligations.
Calculation of interest savings that have been realized from refund-
ing is complicated by the fact that outlays and savings occur at
ferent points in time. Considering bond refunding as a risk-free invest-
ment by the firm, Bowlin° has made a calculation of the rates of
return earned on forty bond refundings by public utilities in 1962
°OswaldD. Bowlin, "The Refunding Decision: Another Special Case in Capital
Budgeting," Journal of Finance, March 1966, pp. 66—67.Influences on Corporate Bond Yields 145
and 1963. The procedure used was to discount after-tax net interest
savings (for each year until the maturity date of the refunded bond)
at a rate that equates their present value with the net cash investment.
The range of rates of return on the investment in refunding was from
3.6 to 43.4 per cent (or 26.7 per cent on the second highest bond)
and the interquartile range was 9.1 to 14.6 per cent. Because the after-
tax cost of funds on refunding bonds was about 2 to 2% per cent,
none of the forty bonds was refunded at a loss •and some involved
very high rates of return. However, Bowlin's rate of return calculations
do not indicate the magnitude of interest savings relative to total
interest costs and, hence, do not shed much light on the value of the
call option. We made a calculation of the difference between (a) the
yield to maturity on the refunded bond calculated from the call price,
which is the gross return to the company from buying back its own
bond, and (b) the yield to maturity on the refunding bond calculated
from the price received from the underwriter, which is the cost of
funds to the company. We then averaged these yield differences over
the 85 refundings of utility bonds in our sample for which the neces-
sary data were available. The average was 50 basis points.10
Some refundings were for reasons other than to reduce interest
costs. One reason was to refund the debt of a newly acquired sub-
sidiary company following a consolidationmerger in order to re-
move restrictions from the bond indenture or to simplify and con-
solidate debt. In several cases such refundings raised interest costs.
Refundings also were used to remove restrictive clauses or consolidate
debt without any connection with mergers.11
This measure of interest savings is not entirely satisfactory becauseitin-
volves averaging over a nonlinear price-yield relationship and using two differ-
ent discount rates. Moreover, itdoes not consider costs associated with the
refunding other than the call premium on the outstanding issue and under-
writing spread on the new issue, and it does not include the effect of taxation
of increased profits.
Frank C. Jen and James E. Wert have estimated the difference between the
offering yield and realizedyield on funds investedincallableutility bonds
issued and called during and the effect of call deferments on realized
yields in1956.—66. See their articles, "The Effect of Call Risk on Corporate
Bond Yields," Journal of December 1967, and "The Deferred Call
Provision and Corporate Bond Journal of Financial and Quan illative
Analysis, June 1968.
"In 1955—56, the Baltimore atici Ohio Railroad consolidated all of the re-
fundable mortgages of its divisional companies into a single systemwide mort-
gage. A company officialat the time announced that this removed restrictive
provisions on the railroad's dividend policy, expressed hopes that it would raise146 Essays on Interest Rates
The call option has also been used to reduce bond indebtedness
pending liquidation of the firm, to retire debt with funds obtained from
property condemnation settlements, and to alter a firm's capital struc-
ture. In the latter case, marketable bonds have been replaced with
private placements, with bank loans, and with common stock.
These diverse reasons for exercising the call option demonstrate
that the financial flexibility provided by free callability is valuable, even
in the absence of expectations of declining interest rates.
THE INFLUENCE OF COUPON RATE ON SEASONED
PUBLIC UTILITY BOND YIELDS
This section analyzes the effect of coupon rate on seasoned public
utility bond yields. The yield series used were constructed for this
project. They cover seasoned long-term callable Aa-Aaa public utility
bonds during 1957—67, broken down by coupon rate. The data are
shown in Appendix Table 3-A.
The Historical Record, January 1957 to October 1967
Chart 3-1 presents time series on the yield spreads between bonds
with various coupon rates .and bonds with a coupon rate of 2% to 2%
per cent. These spreads are large and variable; the spread for the 5
per cent coupon series averages 32 basis points and ranges up to 100
basis points. The spread is larger the higher the coupon rate. This re-
lationship can be seen more directly in Chart 3-2, which presents
cross sections relating spread to coupon rate on specified dates.
Chart 3-1 also demonstrates that spreads increase as the level of
yields declines. This relationship can be seen more directly in Chart
3-3, where the spread for bonds with a given coupon rate is plotted
against the yield on bonds with a 2%—2% per cent coupon.
Hypotheses to Explain the Influence of Coupon Rate on
Yields
The Call Option.
One reason for the coupon rate to influence yield is that, because of
the threat of call, bonds do not sell at more than a point or two above
the company's credit rating, and estimated that it would also save the company
an annual $2.7 million in interest payments on the $345 million debt.Influences on Corporate Bond Yields 147
CHART 3—1. Yield Differentials,Callable Aa-Aaa Utility Bonds With
Specified Coupon Rates Less Bonds With Coupons of 2% to 27/8 Per Cent,
1957—67
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CHART 3—3. YieldDifferentials,Callable Aa-AaaUtility
Bonds With Specified Coupon Rates Less Bonds With Cou-
pons of 2% to 27/8 Per Cent, January 1957—September 1961
Basispoints Basis points
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theircall prices. Because of the practice of raising the call price on
new issues only slightly as the coupon rate is increased, at any given
yield to maturity, higher coupon bonds sell closer to call price, and150 Essays on Interest Rates
hence they reach call price first as yields decline. After the price of a
higher coupon bond reaches the call price, any further fall in the yield
on the low coupon bond results in an equal increase in the spread
between the yields of the two bonds, and the yield spread would be
larger the greater the coupon on the high coupon bond.
In addition, high coupon bonds are less attractive than low coupon
bonds because, if interest rates fall in the future, higher coupon bonds
will have limited capital gains and may be called. We may hypoth-
esize that this would lead investors to require higher yields to ma-
turity on higher coupon bonds even before their price appreciation has
been stopped by the call price.
Miscellaneous Reasons for a Relationship of Yield to Coupon
Rate.
Apart from the call option, several reasons, most of them relatively
minor, can be suggested to explain why investors might prefer low
coupon bonds. Most obvious is the effect of differing tax treatment of
different forms of income. Investors might be expected to prefer low
coupon bonds because they sell at a discount and a larger part of any
given before-tax yield to maturity is in the form of capital gains. A
before-tax yield advantage would therefore be required on high coupon
bonds to attract buyers.
The tax advantage of low coup.on bonds would affect yield relation-
ships only to the extent that the market for corporate bonds is dom-
inated by investors who benefit from the substitution of capital gains
for ordinary income. In fact, consideration of the tax treatment of
the major investors in corporate bonds suggests that tax considerations
are relatively unimportant. The corporate bond market is dominated by
institutional investors, particularly life insurance companies, corporate
pension funds, and state and local retirement funds. The investment
income of corporate pension funds and state and local retirement funds
is tax free, and hence these institutions would receive no tax advantage
by holding lower coupon bonds. Until 1963, the price on
discount bonds did not receive more favorable tax treatment than
coupon income for life insurance companies.12
12Taxableincome of life insurance companies is subject to regular corpora-
tion income taxation. Until1963, life insurance companies were required to
accrue market discounts on bonds and treat this as ordinary incdme for tax
purposes. Since 1963 market discounts realized by insurance companies have
been accorded capitalgains treatment. The excess of net long-termcapitalinfluences on Corporate Bond Yields 151
Moreover, to the extent that tax factors affect the yield differential
between bonds with different coupon rates, the spread should be larger
the higher the general level of yields, since the advantage of the lower
coupon bonds would be greatest when their prices were lowest. In
fact, one finds the opposite relatiOn between the size of spreads and the
level of yields. Tax considerations thus appear to play a negligible role
in determining yield differentials between bonds with different coupon
rates.
A paper by Durand and another by Durand and Winn13 offer a
variety of alleged advantages of low coupon bonds. Macaulay14 has
pointed out that a low coupon bond has a longer "duration" than a
high coupon bond with the same number of years to maturity. Hick-
man,15 in developing the idea of duration as a substitute for maturity,
gains over net short-term capital loss is subject to a tax rate of 25 per cent.
See R. L. Denney, A. P. Rua, and R. J. Schoen, Federal Income Taxation of
Insurance Companies, 2nd ed., New York, 1966, pp. 5.17—18, 6.2—7.
Durand, Basic Yields of Corporate Bonds, 1900—1942, New York,
NBER, 1942, especially pp. 20—21; and David Durand and Willis J. Winn,
Basic Yields on Bonds, 1926—1947: Their Measurement andPattern.New York,
NBER, 1947, especially Addendum pp. 31—40.
The alleged advantages are: (1) It is said that accounting procedures, some-
times adopted by legal requirement, may prevent amortization of premiums on
high coupon bonds and hence force the recording of price premiums as capital
losses when such bonds mature. In contrast, Sidney Homer has suggested to me
that some institutional investors are attracted to high coupon bonds because the
management is rated by the average current income, which is based simply on
coupon receipts excluding discounts on low coupon bonds. (2) The mathemati-
cal relation between yield, price, and the coupon rate for a bond of given
maturity will cause the price increase on low coupon bonds to be greater in
percentage terms than that on high coupon bonds if both of their yields start
at the same level and fall by the same amount, thus making the low coupon
bond preferable if yields are expected to fall. However, this effect is bound to
be very small. (3) It is said that "a high coupon bond, which must be pur-
chasedata substantial premium,isfar more likelytodeclinedrastically
in price than a low coupon bond, which is purchased at a small premium;
traders seem to feel that in a declining market, prices fall fairly freely until
they approach par, at which point they meet resistance to further decline" (Du-
rand and Winn, ibid., p. 35). This assertion has not been verified. (4) There is
said to be an irrational preference for low priced and hence low coupon bonds
merely because they are low priced and thought to be bargains.
"Frederick R. Macaulay, Some Theoretical Problems Suggested by the Move-
ments of Interest Rates, Bond Yields and Stock Prices inthe United States
Since 1856, New York, NBER, 1938, pp. 44—53.
'5W. Braddock Hickman, "The Term Structure of Interest Rates, An Ex-
ploratory Analysis," NBER, unpublished manuscript, 1942, Chapter 5.152 Essays on Interest Rates
argues that higher coupon bonds should sell at lower yields to ma-
turity if the term structure of rates is upward sloping, for the same
reasons that short maturity bonds carry lower yields than long maturity
bonds with the same coupon.
Empirical Evidence: Multiple Regressions
The data listed in Appendix Table 3-A and presented graphically in
Charts 3-i through 3-3 were analyzed using multiple regressions. In
each case, the spread between the yield of the higher coupon bonds
and the average yield on the bonds with a coupon rate of 2% to 2%
per cent was used as the dependent variable whose behavior was to be
explained. The 2% to percent coupon rate is low enough that
during the period under study these bonds had complete call protec-
tion. Testing was limited primarily to regression models derived from
the call and capital gains hypotheses. The basic hypothesis tested was
that the spread between the yields of bonds with different coupon rates
depends on factors which influence the profitability of call or expecta-
tions about future movements in interest rates.
Variables for Multiple Regressions.
COUPON RATE. One independent variable should be a measure of call
protection. This could be both the coupon rate and the call price.
The call price is not practical as a separate variable, however, since
It is set more or less equal to the offering price (usually par) plus the
coupon rate. Because of this practice, there is very little independent
variability in the call price: a higher call price will be associated with a
higher coupon, and therefore with a higher yield, despite the hypoth-
esis that, ceteris paribus, a higher call price leads to a lower yield.
There is a variable that reflects the call protection of both the coupon
rate and the call price. This is the yield to maturity on a bond when
it is purchased at the call price. Either an increase in coupon rate or
a reduction in call price will reduce call protection, and this will be
reflected in an increase in the yield to maturity calculated from the
call price.
Because of the large amount of work required to calculate the yield
to maturity from call price for all observations of all bonds used, only
the coupon rate was used in the regressions as an explanatory variableinfluences on Corporate Bond Yields 153
measuring call protection. Since call prices tend to be higher on bonds
with higher coupon rates, omission of the call price gives a downward
bias to estimates of the influence of coupon rate. In Chart 3-2 we have
already presented graphical evidence of the influence of the coupon
rate on yields.
LEVEL OF YIELDS. A second variable which should influence spreads
is the level of yields. In Chart 3-3, the spreads show a marked ten-
dency to increase as the level of yields is decreased, even when a
further price increase on the higher coupon bond has not yet been
stopped by the call price.
The new issue yield is particularly relevant here because the lower
it is, the greater the probability that it will fall to a level that will
justify refunding. The yield on seasoned bonds with a low coupon
is relevant because the lower it is, the greater the probability that it
will fall to the level where price appreciation on higher coupon bonds
will be halted. We used the level of yields on new issues as an inde-
pendent variable.16
The simple correlation coefficient between the new issue and seasoned
yields is .78. If the yield on seasoned issues is used in the multiple regression,
the R2 and the statistical significance of the level of yields variable are in-
creased. However, econometric considerations argue against the use of the yield
on seasoned bonds with a 2¾ to percent coupon rate as an independent
variable, because it is used in computing the yield spread that we are seeking
to explain. Because any errors of measurement or random movements in the
low coupon seasoned yield series have already been transmitted to the depend-
ent variable, part of its explanatory power in a multiple regression would be
spurious and regression coefficient would be biased.
The problem of spurious correlation and bias should be handled by trans-
forming the regression equation and then using a consistent technique for esti-
mating the parameters. Assume that we start with the simplified model where
the dependent variable is the yield spread between seasoned bonds with a high
coupon rate and bonds with a coupon rate of 2% to 27/s per cent and the only
independent variable is the yield on seasoned bonds with a coupon rate of 2%
to 27/spercent. Then the regression model is:
(Y—X)=a+bX+E,
where Y =theyield on high coupon seasoned bonds; X =theyield on sea-
soned bonds with a coupon rate of 2% toper cent; and E =theerror term.
If we add X to each side of the equation, we have:
Y=a+(1+b)X+E*.
Direct estimation of this by ordinary least squares would introduce simultaneous
equations bias. Using a consistent method of estimation, regressing Y on a con-154 Essays on Interest Rates
The new issue series appears to be a more sensitive indicator of
conditions in the capital markets.17 The series used was compiled by
Sidney Homer and covers newly issued callable Aa public utilities. This
series is shown in Appendix Table 3-C.
CHANGE OF YIELDS. A third variable that might influence the size of
the spread is the direction and rate of change of yields. Expectations
concerning changes in interest rates will influence expectations of call
and capital gains. On the hypothesis that yields are expected to con-
tinue moving in the direction they have been moved in .the recent past,
ceteris paribus, the yield spread due to coupon difference would be
higher when interest rates have been falling.18
As in the case of the level of yields, a choice must be made between
alternative change-in-yield variables. Because of the findings of the
Conard study with regard to the primacy of. the new issue market, we
used the change in new issue yields.19
After some testing,it was decided to use a weighted average of
changes in yields over the past six months. The weights were .75for
the change in yield over the past month, (.75)2forthe month before
that, and so forth back to(.75)°forthe sixth month. This geo-
metrically declining pattern of weights was chosen somewhat arbi-
trarily on the presumption that it would provide a reasonable index
of past yield changes in which a greater weight is given to recent
changes. 20
stantand X; the coefficient of X will be an estimate of (1 + b). The hypothesis
suggests that 0 < (1 + b) (1.
Use of the level of yields on new issues as an independent variable intro-
duces a similar problem of spurious correlation and bias. The coupon rates of
new issues have been high enough that new issue yields are influenced by the
call option. As a result, the new issue yield depends on the yield spread due to
coupon differences, which is the dependent variable in the regression. This in-
troduces simultaneous equations bias.
Joseph W. Conard and Mark W. Frankena, op. cit.
18Ratherthan assume such a theory of expectations, one might assume the
validity of the expectations theory of term structure and derive the expected
change in interest rates from the yield curve. That was not done here.
Simultaneous equations bias arises here again for the same reason it ap-
pears in the coefficient of the level of new issue yields. Changes in the yield
on low coupon seasoned bonds proved to have more explanatory power but
this is probably due to the more erratic nature of new issue rates and to spurious
correlation.
20Analternative would be to estimate the weights using the Almon-Lagrange
interpolation technique, but the reliability of the denved lag structure wouldinfluences on Corporate Bond Yields 155
TIME TREND. Observation of the time series in Chart 3-1 suggests that
there has been a downward trend in the size of yield spreads associated
with differences in coupon rates. The declining trend in spreads is not
due entirely to the upward trend in yield levels with constant regression
coefficients. Chart 3-4 reproduces Chart 3-3 for 4% per cent coupon
bonds with the addition of observations for the period from October
1961 through October 1967. It can be seen that the spreads for the
later period (represented by X's) are substantially lower than those
for the earlier period (represented by circles) at any yield on the low
coupon bonds. Because of this, a time trend variable has been included
in the equation. This variable is given a value of 1 for the first month's
observation, 2 for the second, and so forth. The assumption of a linear
time trend is of course an oversimplification.2' The shift was probably
somewhat greater in 1961 than in the other years. By 1966, spreads had
reached such a low level that continued upward revision in the expected
or "normal" level of yields could not cause much further reduction. As
a result, at the coupon rates used in this study, one should not project the
time beyond the period considered in the regressions.
Two explanations for this reduction in spreads can be suggested. The
first is that there was an upward revision in the expected "normal" level
of interest rates which reduced the value of call protection. If interest
rates in the 1960's were no longer expected to fall to the lows that were
anticipated in the 19 50's, then the danger of refunding and the ex-
pected limitation of capital gains in the event of future price rises would
have been reduced.
A second reason for the trend in the yield spread has been suggested
by Sidney Homer. He emphasizes the role of the supply and demand for
funds in determining yield spreads. On the supply side, secular growth
of large institutional investors has produced an increase in competition
for higher yielding investments and a tendency for yield spreads of many
sorts to be reduced, including those between bonds with different cou-
pons, bonds with different quality ratings, new and seasoned issues, and
corporates and governments. He also argues that from 1961 through
1964 there was a very light volume of new corporate public offerings,
be too low for this method to be a practical improvement. See S. Almon, "The
Distributed Lag between Capital Appropriations and Expenditures," Economet-
rica, January 1965, pp. 178—196.
21Thetime trend was also included as a quadratic because it seemed likely
that the trend was greater in the earlier period when spreads were large. An
increase in the correlation coefficients and reduction in the autocorrelation of




























































































































































































































































































































































eInfluences on Corporate Bond Yields 157
especially after allowance was made for refundings, and a cumulative
drought developed. Because new issues during part of this period did
not have high coupons, and because many outstanding high coupon
bonds were called, the relative supply of high coupon bonds declined
during 1962—63. Further, the volume of long-term governments, which
are closer substitutes for low coupon than high coupon corporate bonds
because of their call protection, increased. Homer believes that these
changes in supply and demand factors explain the decline in the spread
caused by coupon differences, particularly during the 1961—65 period.
VOLUME OF NEW CORPORATE ISSUES. A partial test of the Homer hy-
pothesis can be made by including the volume of new corporate bonds
as an independent variable in the regression equation. On the basis
of our hypotheses, we should expect that, if the volume variable in-
fluences the size of the spread, it would have a positive regression
coefficient. Tests of alternative measures indicated that the volume of
publicly offered issues for the three months preceding the month of
observation gave the best results.
REGRESSIONS. Two types of regression equations were estimated. The
first covered all the bonds in the sample and included the coupon rate
as art independent variable. In the second set,a separate regression
was run for bonds with each coupon rate, and consequently the coupon
rate was not used as an independent, variable.
In the first of these regressions, a linear relation between the natural
logarithms of the data was The logarithmic transformation of
the data was used because our hypothesis and other analysis suggested
that a purely linear relation was inappropriate because the effect that
any given difference in the coupon rate or in the level of yields has on
the spread depends on both the level of the coupon rate and the level
of yields. A full logarithmic transformation of the data makes the first
derivative of the spread with respect to each independent variable
depend on the level of each of the independent variables. With two
Inclusion of privately placed issues or the issues of one month more or
less did not make much difference in the results.
23Becauseitis impossible to take the logarithm of a negative number, 1.00
per cent (100 basis points) was added to the spread and the change-in-yield
variable at each observation before taking the logarithm in order to make all
observations positive.158 Essays on Interest Rates
independent variables, the relation log y = c +b1logx1 +b2logx2 im-
plies a relation between the untransformed data of the form
y =
The first regression was run for all observations from January 1957
through April 1966 .for bonds with coupon rates from 3% through
5% per cent. Table 3-2 provides a summary of the variables used and
the results of the regression.24
TABLE 3-2. Regression of Yield Spread on Explanatory Variables, 3% to
5% Per Cent Coupon Bonds, 1957—66






NOTE: The number of observations =1,294;the standard error of estimate =
.077;R2 =.779;F statistic for R2 =1,134.37;dependent variable is the logarithm of
1.00 plus the yield spread over bonds with a coupon of 2 3/4 to 2 7/8 per cent; X, is
the logarithm of the coupon rate; 12isthe logarithm of the level of the new issue
yield; X3 is the logarithm of 1.00 plus the weighted average of change of new issue
yields; X4 is the logarithm of et, where tis the time trend, or simply t since log (et)
=t.
All regressioncoefficients have the signs hypothesized and are
statistically significant at the .01 level. Approximately 78 per cent of
the variance of the dependent variableis"explained" by the re-
gression. It should be noted that no measure for volume of new issues
was included in this regression.
Regressions were also run separately at each coupon rate for the
higher coupon bonds, again using all observations available between
January 1957 and April 1966. This time no logarithmic transformation
of the data was made, but the level of new issue yields was included
as a quadratic term. There was, therefore, one independent variable
for the new issue yield and another for its square. The form of the
regression equation was linear apart from this transformation. Table
24Toprovide a better test for the remaining observations, it might be desir-
able to run the same regression omitting all observations where the market
price of the high coupon bond was close to or held at the call price.Influences on Corporate Bond Yields 159
3-3 describes the symbols used in the regression equations and gives
the results.
In these regressions, the independent variables account for between
81 and 89 per cent of the variance in the yield spread. Moreover, all
regression coefficients have the signs required by our hypotheses. With
the exception of the change-in-yield variable in the first and last re-
gressions, all variables are significant at the .01 level.25
Although these results generally support the hypotheses, the co-
efficient of the time trend seems implausibly large. Our interpretation
of the time trend is primarily that it takes account of the upward
revision in the expected "normal" and cyclical minimum levels of
yields.
ZERO SPREADS. It is of some interest to know the yield level, if any,
at which the yield spread for an intermediate or high coupon bond
approaches zero. On the basis of our hypothesis, there is no reason
to expect that the yield spread on higher coupon bonds should ever
become zero as long as a fall in yields is anticipated, because the lower
coupon bonds would still have an advantage in terms of call protection
and capital gains potential. However, in the past decade spreads did
approach to within a very few basis points of zero at a time when
yields on the lower coupon bonds rose to the level of the coupon rate
on the higher coupon bond and the higher coupon bond was therefore
selling below par. This can be seen in Charts 3-2 and 3-4.
LIMITATIONS OF THE REGRESSION RESULTS. A statistical problem en-
countered in the regressions which we have discussed is autocorrelation
among errors. According to the Durbin-Watson statistics for the re-
gressions in Table 3-3,all have significant positive first-order serial
correlation of the residuals. Autocorrelation alone does not introduce
a bias into the estimated regression coefficients as long as the assump-
tions of the least squares statistical procedure hold. However, the sig-
nificance levels of the regression coefficients are lower than is indicated
by the calculated t values. The presence of autocorrelation also suggests
that some errors have been made in the specification of the regression
equation.
The reliability of the individual regression coefficientsis further
weakened by the likelihood of multicollinearity among the independent
variables because of their related cycles and trends.
Because of the autocorrelated residuals, however, the true significance lev-


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Influences on Corporate Bond Yields 161
Finally, because of the inclusion of a time trend and nonlinear terms,
the regression equations we have estimated do not permit extrapolation
beyond the limits of the observations used in estimation.
Despite these problems all the results appear consistent with theo-
retical of how call features should affect yields. Any gains
from more exact specification of the relationships do not seem to merit
the additional costs involved.
THE INFLUENCE OF CALL DEFERMENTS ON PUBLIC
UTILITY BOND YIELDS2°
Opinions and Policies of Regulatory Commissions and
the Financial Community
The Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Power Com-
mission, and the public service commissions of the various states regulate
the sale of bonds by utility companies. Before refunding deferments
came into widespread use in 1956, the SEC developed a policy designed
to prevent restrictions on callability. This policy, which was in effect
throughout the period under study, required that "securities be redeem-
able at the option of the issuer at any time upon reasonable notice and
the payment of a reasonable redemption premium, if any." The purpose
of this provision was "to assure that public utility companies shall be
in a position, if money rates decrease materially, to refund their bonds"
and thus "to ensure economies in the raising of capital." In addition
to denying the use of refunding deferments, they ruled that call protection
could not be provided by setting a very high call price or setting a low
coupon rate and selling at a discount.27
20Astudy of this problem was made independently by Frank C. Jen and
James E. Wert and reported in "The Value of the Deferred Call Privilege,"
NationalBanking Review, March1966, pp. 369—378. They studied the period
1960—64 and arrived at the same conclusions reached here. See also Gordon
Pye, "The Value of Call Deferment on a Bond: Some Empirical Results,"
Journal of Finance, December 1967, pp. 623—636.
"The working policy of the Commission has been that the initial redemp-
tion price shall not exceed the sum of theinitialpublic offering price plus
the coupon rate on the bonds." SEC, 23rd Annual Report, Fiscal Year Ending
June30,1957, Washington, D.C., 1958, p.142. Substantially the same state-
ments are contained in every annual report through the present. See 31st Annual
Report, Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1965, p. 91. The FPC has taken substantially
the same position, denying requests for authorization of refunding deferments162 Essays on Interest Rates
In opposing restrictions on the call option, the SEC and FPC argue
that the potential benefits of refunding outweigh whatever increase in
the cost of funds is attributable to free callability.
The SEC stated that "issues of immediately refundable bonds have, on
the whole, not been penalized in the market place as compared with
those users which accepted refunding restriction."28 As support for its
position, the SEC has cited evidence on new issue yields, on the average
number of underwriter bids received at competitive bidding, and on
the success with which issues were marketed by the underwriter. The
SEC argues that its position is supported by the study of offering yields
during 1926—59 made by Hess and Winn, which found that only in
the second half of 1959 was there any difference in yields on freely
callable bonds and thosecarryingrefunding deferments.29 More-
over,the SEC reportsthat"studies made by theCommission's
staff...withrespect to electric and gas utility bond issues sold at
competitive bidding. ..indicatedthat the presence or absence of a
restriction on free refundability has not affected the number of bids
received by an issuer at competitive bidding or the ability of the
winning bidder to market the bonds."3°
Despite the denial of deferments by the SEC and FPC since 1957,
about a third of the public offerings of utility bonds (and a larger pro-
portion of industrial issues and private placements) have had refunding
deferments. This indicates that a large number of corporate borrowers
on new issues. Commissions in the states have in general issued similar statements
againstdeferments,but in practice many have permitted them.
SEC, 28thAnnualReport, p.93. TheFPCsimilarlystatedin 1957 that,
despite the value of the call option to the borrower, which would justify pay-
ment of a higher cost for funds, "our experience to date has not shown a
material difference in the cost of money, on a current basis, of comparable
issues with a limitation on the right of redemption and those without." Public
Utility Reports, 19 PUR 3d, 1957, p. 187, re Puget Sound Power and Light Co.
"These differences, indicating somewhat lower interest costs on bonds having
refunding restrictions, were found by the Wharton School (i.e., Hess and Winn,
op. cit.) not to have been material—at least when measured against the advan-
tage to the issuer of being able to refund its bonds at any time." SEC, 28th
AnnualReport,p. 93.
Thisstudy included the period from May 14, 1957, through fiscal year 1965,
and was based on simple and weighted (by volume) averages of bids by under-
writers and of amounts sold at the syndicate offering price up to the date of
termination of the syndicate, with the time unit over which the averages were
taken in each case being a fiscal year. The only statistics that were at variance
with the SEC's conclusion were the marketability indices for fiscal years 1963
and 1965. SEC, 31st Annual Report, pp. 92—93, and earlier Reports.influences on Corporate Bond Yields 163
have thought the inclusion of a deferment would increase market
attractiveness and reduce the.current cost of funds.
On the basis of answers to a questionnaire, Hess and Winn found
that in early 1960 large institutional investors thought that on a thirty-
year Aa utility issue with a 5% per cent coupon, "a five-year (call)
deferment would be worth 15 basis points, a ten-year (call) deferment
25 basis points, and a thirty-year deferment (a nonrefundable issue)
30 to 36 basis points," though a wide range of estimates was given
in each case.31 They also found that if both the coupon on new issues
and the yield on outstandings were reduced by 1 %percent, the median
estimated value of a five-year deferment declined to about 5 basis
points. This suggests that the value of the call deferments to investors
is considered to be an increasing function of the coupon rate on the
bond in question.32
In addition to borrowers and institutional investors, people acquainted
with the financial market have often indicated that a call deferment on
a high coupon bond reduces its yield. In 1957, 1959, and 1960, Moody's
BondSurveyconsistently recommended investment in call-protected new
issues and in 1959said:"Because interest rates are close to the highest
levels seen in many years, we consider nonrefundable and noncallable
provisions in bonds very important for long-term investors....We
expect that more of the new issues will have to incorporate protection
from early redemption in order to give market attractiveness."33 In
mid-1957 Moody's wrote: "As in past weeks, investor preference for
protection from early call showed up markedly in the receptions accorded
new corporate issues...Issueswithout protective call provisions re-
quired much higher yields."34 Similarly, the financial section of the
New York Times in mid-1957 said that callable bonds were selling
poorly and public utilities were faced with the need to pay much more
than nominally higher yields to get callable loans and that "for bonds of
less than top rank...maintainingthe unlimited call privilege means
"Hessand Winn, op.cit.,p. 21. Comments in parentheses were added.
One problem in the interpretation of these figuresisthat Hess and Winn
were unable to determine whether the respondents were attempting to give the
true or market value of call protection. Although the Hess and Winn study
did not include bonds issued in 1960, their estimates are in line with the value
put on call protection by the market in early 1960, which was about 15 basis
points for a five-year refunding deferment, including the effect of coupon differ-
ence due to the initial yield spread.
Moody's BondSurvey,August 17, 1959, p. 351.
Ibid.,June24, 1957, p.463.164 Essays on interest Rates
incurring %of1 per cent more in costs," while for an Aaa bond the
added cost was per
There has, therefore, been some difference of opinion on whether
call deferments have an effect on bond yields.
Empirical Evidence
Hess and Winn's study of the influence of deferments on the yield
of new corporate issues offered from 1926 to 1959 concluded that the
existence of a "call deferment did not influence yields except during
the last six months of this 34-year This conclusion is mis-
leading because the number of deferred issues before 1957 was too
small to permit meaningful comparisons. Between 1926 and 1949 only
17 of the 738 bonds issued had deferments, and these included indus-
trials and private placements as well as publicly offered utilities. The
most detailed breakdown that could be made held quality rating and
calendar month of issue constant. Because neither utility and industrial
issues nor publicly offered and privately placed issues are sufficiently
alike to warrant comparison, because private placements are not rated
for quality, and because a month is too long a period in which to
assume that market conditions remain constant, the data cannot justify
the conclusion that "length of call deferment did not influence yields."
Similarly, since there were only 12 deferred issues among the 166 new
issues in the period from 1950 through 1955 and all 12 of these were
on private placements, on which quality ratings are not available, no
conclusion on the effect of deferments on yieldsis possible in this
period either. Perhaps the most significant conclusion that can be
drawn is that prior to 1956 there was not enough interest in deferments
for investors to insist on them, except in some private placements in
the early 1950's. No doubt this is explained by the fact that new issue
coupons were generally so low that call protection was provided by
the coupon and call price and a deferment would have added little.
The basic hypothesis testedinthe present study for both new
and seasoned issues is that a deferment reduces the yield on a cor-
porate bond if the coupon rateis high enough that investors think
there is a possibility of call or of capital gains limitation. This implies
a positive relation between the size of the yield spread between callable
and deferred issues with a given coupon rate and the size of the yield
New York Times, June23,1957
Hess arid Winn, op. cit., p. 80.Influences on Corporate Bond Yields 165
spread between seasoned callable bonds with this same coupon rate
and those with a very low coupon rate, since both yield spreads reflect
the market valuation of call protection.
A first corollary hypothesis is that the amount by which the yield
is reduced by a deferment is higher for higher coupon bonds, or it
increases when the coupon rate increases relative to the expected
"normal" and cyclical minimum rates of interest. If expectations about
the level of future interest rates have an elasticity of less than one with
respect to the present level of interest rates, then when interest rates
and the new issue coupon rate increase together, borrowers and in-
vestors will believe that the probability of call or of capital gains
limitation on new issues has increased. This means that when the new
issue coupon rate increases, the amount by which the new issue yield
is reduced by a deferment increases even though the level of yields
increases simultaneously.a7
A second corollary, which applies only to seasoned issues, is that
the amount by which the yield on a bond with a given coupon rate
is reduced by a deferment increases when the level of yields declines.
A third corollaryisthat the yield spread between callable and
deferred issues with the same coupon rate is only a fraction of the yield
spread between the same callable bond and a bond with a very low
coupon rate. Although deferments limit the exercise of the call option,
they provide less call protection than a low coupon. Most deferments
restrict refunding only at a lower interest cost (call for other purposes
isstill permitted) and only for five years. When coupons are high
enough that borrowers and investors think there is a high probability
that refunding would be profitable within the first five years, they are
also apt to think that there will be another chance for refunding after
the deferment ends.38
h1Thiswould apply to comparisons for consecutive periods but not necessarily
more distant periods, between which there could be major changes in expecta-
tions about the "normal" rate of interest.
Thus, for example, most of the bonds issued in 1957 and since refunded were
called in late 1962 and 1963, after the deferred issues had become callable. As
a result, five out of the ten utility bonds rated A or better issued with deferments
in 1957 and having coupons high enough (5 per cent or over) to be threatened
by call in 1962—63 actually were called. On the other hand, these deferments did
prevent refunding in 1958 when much greater savings could have been realized,
the deferments on high coupon bonds issued in 1959—60 prevented their refunding
in 1962—63, and if the bonds issued in 1953 had had deferments these deferments
would have prevented refunding altogether, because after 1954—55 rates never
again fell far enough to make the refunding of these bonds profitable.166 Essays on Interest Rates
Except in 1957, the evidence presented below supports the hy-
pothesis and its corollaries concerning the influence of deferments on
bond yields. Based on annual averages, deferments are found to reduce
yields by up to 14 basis This implies that the capital market
is considerably less imperfect than Hess and Winn and various agencies
regulating the issuance of corporate have contended.
It was not until 1957 that a significant number of publicly offered
corporate bonds had refunding deferments. However, during 1957—66
a substantial proportion of new issues had deferments, and therefore
it is possible to compare systematically yields on freely callable and
deferred issues.
For new issues, this analysis covers only long-term public utility
mortgage bonds and senior debentures rated A, Aa, or Aaa by Moody
and publicly offered under competitive bidding in principal amounts
of $2 million or more. Quality rating is held constant in all yield com-
parisons. While size of issue is not held constant, all but a few issues
were larger than $10 million. Most of the bonds have a maturity of
about 30 years and all are within the 20 to 40 year range. Table 3-4
shows the deferment characteristics of the new issues.
In order to hold market conditions stable, yield comparisons were
limited to bonds issued within a period of 10 days of each other. For
the period 1957 to mid-1966, it was possible to make 108 such com-
parisons, each involving one or more freely callable and one or more
deferred issues, but not more than one of both. Comparisons were
made both between offering yields and between yields at which the
bonds were selling in the open market during the first weeks after they
"Wehave not undertaken an independent study of the number of underwriter
bids or the success of the winning bidder in marketing an issue for deferred and
caltable bonds. The SEC found that, in terms of yearly averages, deferred issues
have not had an advantage on either count, and may have had a slight disad-
vantage. However, it should be pointed out that if prices are adjusted to offset
any disadvantage of free callability, there would be no reason for a difference
in number of bids or success in marketing. Further, superficial study indicates
that the average size of deferred issues is larger than the average size of freely
callable issues, and that there is an inverse relation between size of issue and
number of bids, because the larger the issue the greater the number of under-
writers that must combine to make a single bid. Thus, there would be a slight
bias against deferred issues in terms of number of bids which was not related to
the fact that they were deferred. Third, to the extent that deferred and freely
callable issues are not similarly spaced within a given fiscal year, the use of
yearly averages could cover up differences. In any event, we found a number
of cases where the contemporary financial press said an issue had a better market
reception because it had a deferment.Influences on Corporate Bond Yields 167
TABLE 3-4.Classificationof New A, Aa, and Aaa Utility Issues With
















1957 104 26 5 2 of 10 years
1 of years
1958 89 23 2 None
1959 75 21 2 1 of 7 years
1960 79 28 4 None
1961 68 27 6 1 of 10 years
1962 69 29 8 None
1963 65 24 10 None






aCall deferments restrict use of the call option not only for refunding at lower
interest cost but for other purposes as well. Most deferments apply to refunding only.
were released from price maintenance agreements. The latter make it
possible to eliminate a major part of any difference in yields due to
differences in market conditions at the dates of offering. They also
make it possible to discover the market valuation of call deferments
when one of the issues was mispriced by the underwriter.
A complication arises because coupon rates on new issues are set so
that the offering price will be near par: Any reduction in yield caused
by a deferment will tend to lead to a reduction in coupon rate. Con-
sequently, the coupons on the deferred bonds used in the comparisons
will be systematically lower than those on the corresponding freely
callable issues, and average spreads measured between such pairs will
exaggerate the influence of deferments on yields by capturing the effect
of differences in coupon rate. To eliminate the influence of differences
in coupon rate, prior to averaging, each yield spread was adjusted for
the effect of the difference in coupon rates of the deferred and callable
issues in the month of issue, using the data in Appendix Table 3-A.
The average yield spreads for each year are presented in Table 3-5.
Spreads are negative when the average yield on the deferred issues was
lower. Columns (2) and (4) present spreads for offering yields, before






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Influences on Corporate Bond Yields 169
(6)and (8) present the corresponding spreads for market yields after
termination of price maintenance agreements. In the column to the right
of each average yield spread is the significance level applicable to tests
of the null hypothesis that the average yield spread is zero. These are
based on one-tailed tests for the mean of a normally distributed random
variable (the yield spread for individual pairs of bonds) with unknown
variance. Column (11) presents the annual average of spreads, calcu-
lated in the month of issue for each deferred bond, between the yields
of callable seasoned bonds with the same coupon rate as the deferred
issue and seasoned bonds with coupon rates of 2% to per cent.40
This measures the market value of the addition of complete refunding
protection (offered by a very low coupon) to a freely callable bond
with the same coupon as the deferred issue, and can be compared
to the market value of the five-year deferment shown in column (8).
The findings in Table 3-5 can be summarized as follows:(a) All
annual average yield spreads for 1957 through 1961 and for 1966 are
negative. (b) All average spreads for 1958 through 1961 and for
1966, except that for offering yields corrected for coupon in 1958,
are statistically significant at the .025 level, and most are significant
at the .01 level. (c) The average spreads for 1957areonly marginally
significant at the .05 and .10 levels.(d) The average spreads for
1962 through 1965 are random in sign and, except for the negative
average yields after termination of price maintenance in 1965, are
not statistically significant. (e) Omitting 1957, average yield spreads
are largest and statistically significant in the same years that the yield
spread in column (11), measuring the market value at current new
issue coupon rates of the addition of the complete refunding protection
offered by a very low coupon, is relatively high. The yield spread in
column (11) is low in each year from 1962 through 1965, indicating
that for bonds with the coupon rates on new issues the market value
of additional refunding protection was very low. (f) On a year-to-year
basis, the direction of change for all statistically significant yield spreads
corrected for coupon in columns (4) and (8)is the same as the
direction of the change in the average coupon rate in column (10).
(g) in every case the average reduction in yield due to deferments is
a fraction of the spread in column (11) in the same year. (h) After
correction for coupon, at current new issue coupons, average yield
reductions due to deferments are 5 to 14 basis points in all years
(except 1958) where the additional call protection provided by a low
See Appendix Table 3-A.170 Essays on Interest Rates
coupon reduces yields by over 15 basis points compared to freely
callable issues with the same coupon rate as the deferred new issues.
Except for (c), all of these findings provide clear support for the
basic hypothesis, that a deferment reduces the yield on a corporate
bond if the coupon rate is high enough that investors think there is
a possibility of call or capital gains limitation. Finding (e)—the low
spreads in column (11) for 1962 through 1965—explains finding (d).
A possible explanation for (c), the lack of statistical support for
the hypothesis in 1957, is that market valuation of deferments was
irregular because both high coupons and deferments were new to the
market. This is consistent with the finding of a more uniform valuation
of call protection after the market gained experience with high coupons
and deferments and after the sudden decline in interest rates in 1958
demonstrated the potentials of the call option and call protection.
Finding (f) supports the first corollary hypothesis, that when the
new issue coupon rate increases, the amount by which the new issue
yield is reduced by a deferment increases even though the level of
yields increases simultaneously.
While the second corollary does not apply to new issues, finding (g)
supports the third corollary, that the yield spread between callable and
deferred issues with the same coupon rate is only a fraction of the
yield spread between the same callable bond and a bond with a very
low coupon rate.
To test the same hypotheses concerning the influence of refunding
deferments on yields on seasoned bonds, monthly series were con-
structed at each coupon rate for the average yield of Aa-Aaa utility
bonds comparable to those used in the regressions above41 except that
the bonds in the present series have deferments of two years or longer.
The yield spreads between these two sets of series for freely callable
and deferred issues are presented in Appendix Table 3-B, with spreads
negative when the yield on deferred bonds was lower. Table 3-6
presents averagesofspreads, broken down by coupon rate,for
1957—61, 1958, 1962—65, and 1966.
No complication due to differences in coupon ratesarises here
because the spreads are calculated holding coupon rate constant. The
spreads for seasoned issues are most similar in nature to those for new
issues after termination of price maintenance and after correction for
coupon differences, but they differ from the latter in two ways. First,
because the seasoned bonds have been outstanding for some time,














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6172 Essays on Interest Rates
deferments in the present series are for less than five years from the
date of observation. The period of deferment averaged 3 to 4 years
and in a number of cases the average period declined from almost
five years to only two years over the set of observations. Second, while
the observations for new issues were made only at times when the
level of new issue yields was near the coupon rate, for seasoned issues
observations were made over a wide range of yield levels.
The findings in Table 3-6 can be summarized as follows: (a) With
two exceptions, both low coupon bonds, all average yield spreads in
1957—61, 1958, and 1966 are negative. (b) All spreads for 1962—65
are negligible. (c) Except in 1962—65, spreads were larger on bonds
with coupons of to 5% per cent than on those with lower coupon
rates.(d)Spreads increased considerablyin1958.(e)Average
spreads on high coupon bonds were 6 to 9 basis points during 1957
to 1961 and 1966 and twice that in 1958.
All of these findings provide support for the basic hypothesis about
the effect of deferments on yields. Finding (b)is explained in the
same way as the parallel finding for new issues. Finding (c) supports
the first corollary hypothesis. New issue yields declined considerably
in 1958, and finding (d) supports the second corollary, that the amount
by which the yield on a bond with a given coupon rate is reduced by
a deferment increases when the level of yields declines. The third
corollary is supported by a comparison of yield spreads due to differ-






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































IInfluences on Corporate Bond Yields 179
NOTES TO APPENDIX TABLE 3-A
NOTE: Quotations were taken from the daily public utility quotation sheets of
Solomon Brothers and Hutzler and The First Boston Corporation, and are calculated
from the asked price for individual bonds on the business day closest to the beginning
of the month. Yields are therefore a few basis points lower than if they had been
calculated in the more conventional manner from the mid-point of the bid and asked
prices. The series for 3 1/8 to 3 3/8 bonds was constructed by Sidney Homer. The
averages include all Aa-Aaa utility bonds maturing between 1980 and 2010, except
convertibles and sinking fund debentures, issues smaller than $10 million, and issues
outstanding less than four months. Gaps in the series arise when there were no
observations for bonds with the specified coupon rate.A
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